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 1 
Kissinger, China, Congress, and the Lost Chance for Cambodia 
 
Amongst professional historians, Henry A. Kissinger arguably has come under fire 
as much for his record as a historian as for his record as a diplomat, and when it 
comes to his role in the tragic tale of Cambodia in the 1970s he has been severely 
criticized on both scores.
i
  This article seeks to re-examine the ultimately doomed 
U.S.-China attempt to broker a peace settlement in Cambodia in the first half of 1973.  
Kissinger blamed the failure of this effort on Congress’s imposition of a bombing 
halt; supporters of the bombing halt contended that such an apportionment of blame 
was merely designed to deflect attention from Kissinger’s own role in the bombing 
(both secret and overt) of Cambodia and the rise of the Khmer Rouge as the ultimate 
victor in Cambodia’s civil war.  Few judgements of culpability in the modern 
historical record could have more import, given the outcome of the Khmer Rouge’s 
genocidal four-year reign of terror that began in 1975. 
 As well as examining the question of who, if anyone, was to blame for the 
failure to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Cambodia civil war in early 1973, 
this article also illustrates the distortive effect that the war in Indochina continued to 
have on the burgeoning United States-People’s Republic of China relationship long 
after the ink had dried on the Paris Peace Accords that formally ended America’s 
involvement in Vietnam’s civil war.  It highlights the conflicting pressures that came 
to bear on Sino-American relations as a result of U.S. domestic politics and 
Kissinger’s own career aspirations, and their connections to domestic Chinese 
politics. 
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 The signing of the Paris Peace Accords had catapulted Kissinger to global 
superstardom (driving his boss “mad” in the process), and the conclusion of 
America’s direct involvement in the Vietnam War had been received with relief and 
satisfaction in Beijing.
ii
  China had maintained a conflicting duality in its foreign 
policy for over three years, as it attempted to pursue a rapprochement with the 
United States while simultaneously continuing to provide material support for 
Hanoi’s war.  The conflict had become increasingly acute in the wake of U.S. 
President Richard Nixon’s successful visit to Beijing and the launch of the 
Vietnamese Spring Offensive.  North Vietnam’s attack on South Vietnam had, 
however, run into the ground, despite Chinese support; Hanoi was not able to win at 
the negotiating table what it had not won on the battlefield.  South Vietnamese 
President Nguyen Van Thieu was going to play a part in the political dispensation in 
Saigon, at least for the duration of a ‘decent interval’. 
 Viewed from Beijing, the overall situation at the dawn of 1973 looked 
promising.  Mao had found in Nixon someone who he believed would be a reliable 
partner in countering the Soviet menace.  Nixon’s landslide win in the November 
1972 election, surpassing even Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 margin of victory in the 
popular vote, established him in a powerful position to advance the full 
normalization of Sino-American relations in his second term.  As Zhou Enlai told 
senior Khmer Rouge official Penn Nouth, Thieu would be “dealt with” in time, after 
the completion of the American withdrawal.
iii
  The situation in Laos would also be 
easily brought under control, given the Pathet Lao’s status as a passive client of 
Hanoi; and while the Cambodian situation was a more complicated tripartite 
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arrangement, since all of Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi wanted to see the situation 
there resolved there was a reasonable expectation that it too would be brought under 
control.  A new era in the international relations of the Indochinese states was about 
to begin. 
 
U.S.-China Co-operation on Cambodia 
 
Zhou Enlai had established a framework in which the U.S. and the People’s Republic 
of China could, in Mao’s words, “work together to deal with a bastard” – the Soviet 
Union.
iv
  As part of this framework the United States had withdrawn its forces from 
South Vietnam.  The North Vietnamese had agreed to orchestrate a ceasefire in Laos 
through their Laotian communist clients, the Pathet Lao.  All that remained to be 
settled was an agreement on Cambodia, where China held a much stronger hand than 
in Laos, and where China had long been cultivating deposed Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk to play a key role.
v
 
 Ever since the Cambodian Head of State had been overthrown in a ‘coup’ led 
by General Lon Nol in March 1970 and established his national front (FUNK) and 
national unity government-in-exile (GRUNK) in alliance with the Khmer Rouge, the 
Chinese government had invested large amounts of both political prestige and hard 
cash in promoting Sihanouk’s legitimacy as the head of the Cambodian nation.  $10 
million in used dollar bills went to the GRUNK each year – half for Sihanouk’s 
government in Beijing, and half smuggled down the Ho Chi Minh trail into the 
Cambodian interior for the Khmer Rouge to buy weapons with.  In no small part 
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through the efforts of Zhou and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, by early 1973 
Sihanouk’s government was recognized by more than 30 countries.  Such was the 
P.R.C.’s interest in gaining recognition for Sihanouk’s GRUNK that Chinese 
observers at a non-aligned movement conference even went to the extent of 
personally removing the literature of Lon Nol’s delegation from the other 
delegations’ boxes in an effort to prevent it being recognized.vi 
 Thus, when Henry Kissinger arrived in the Chinese capital in February 1973 
for discussions of the post-Paris Agreement situation, the situation in Cambodia, 
along with the ever-present Soviet threat, dominated.  Zhou had outlined to Nixon 
one year previously his belief that if the war in Indochina was stopped “that is to say 
a reversion of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk, then the North Vietnamese will surely 
withdraw.”vii  He had further elaborated to the President’s national security adviser 
during Kissinger’s visit to China in the summer of 1972 his own vision for post-war 
Indochina.  “If an end can be put to the war, then in Cambodia Sihanouk will 
ultimately be the head of state.  And in Laos the head will be King Vatthana… And 
in both these countries their characteristic of neutrality will be more pronounced and 
in South Vietnam at least for a time it will be neutral…  And that area will become in 
a certain sense a kind of buffer.”viii  The Premier also voiced approval for a wider 
zone of neutrality in Southeast Asia, involving Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and 
the Philippines, referring to the envisioned Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) proposed by Malaysia in 1971 at a meeting of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, reversing China’s long-
standing hostility to that organisation.  ZOPFAN was designed to be, in the words of 
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Sheldon Smith, “something of a security model for the Association that, if realized, 
would serve as an alternative to competitive military buildups within Southeast Asia 
and the countervailing military activities of such external powers as the United States 
and the Soviet Union.”ix  In Zhou’s mind, while perhaps not a formal member of 
ZOPFAN, Cambodia too would play a part in this zone of neutrality. 
 At first glance, this task appeared not easy.  Sihanouk’s GRUNK issued a 
statement on 26 January 1973 reaffirming its stance as contained within the prince’s 
23 March 1970 five-point statement.
x
  This did not bode well for an American-
facilitated negotiation between Lon Nol’s government and the GRUNK.  Likewise, 
Zhou forcefully rejected contact between his own government and that of Lon Nol.  
He reprimanded Kissinger – “You should also not deal with such a man who carries 
on subversive activities against the King… we think it not very – it is not fair for you 
to admit [recognize] Lon Nol.”  China’s disdain for Lon Nol was not entirely as a 
result of affection for Sihanouk, it should be noted.  The Soviet Union had 
recognised Lon Nol’s government; getting rid of him and undermining the Soviet 
position was a critical factor in Zhou’s calculations.xi 
 Undeterred by Zhou’s initial obduracy, Kissinger proposed finding “an 
interim solution that is acceptable to both sides”.xii  At this stage, however, entering 
into direct discussions with Sihanouk was not part of his plan.  Kissinger worried 
that if it became known that the U.S. was negotiating with Sihanouk it would cause a 
collapse of morale within the Lon Nol regime that would prove terminal, and deem 
futile his intended purpose of the talks: the establishment of a tripartite regime in 
Phnom Penh, in a similar fashion to that which had just been agreed for South 
 6 
Vietnam.  In his 26 January statement Sihanouk had stated (under declared ‘advice’ 
from the FUNK’s “friends”) his and the FUNK’s willingness to enter into 
discussions with the United States, though “without great hopes… because the U.S. 
government was no more inclined to abandon Lon Nol than Thieu.”  This had been 
reinforced by a statement from the ‘interior’ (i.e. the Khmer Rouge) reiterating that 
Sihanouk’s 23 March 1970 declaration was the only acceptable basis for resolving 
the issue of Cambodia.  This meant that although he was willing to talk, he was 
opposed to a Vietnam-type settlement.  “Insofar as Cambodia is concerned” he had 
announced, “I represent the legality while Lon Nol is but a traitor.  We cannot accept 
a solution identical to that which was reached for South Vietnam.”xiii 
 Aware of Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge’s recent public declaration to 
persevere against the Lon Nol government, Zhou expressed his conviction that 
neither Sihanouk nor the “Khmer resistance in the interior area in Cambodia” would 
agree to enter into negotiations with Lon Nol, and that Kissinger should drop his 
refusal to talk directly to Sihanouk.  “Well, it doesn’t have to be Lon Nol himself.  It 
could be somebody from that government” volunteered Kissinger.  Zhou was clearly 
interested by this suggestion, and unlike his previous persistent and firm refusals to 
act as an intermediary between Kissinger and the Vietnamese during the American’s 
quest to end the war in that country, the Chinese Premier casually stated that “Of 
course, since Sihanouk is in China we cannot but tell him your opinion in our 
wording, but of course, we have our own position on this question.”  Despite Zhou’s 
protestations that they still supported Sihanouk’s five point declaration, some form 
of Chinese mediation was in the offing.
xiv
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 When Kissinger brought up the issue one day later, he was told that Zhou did 
not have an answer yet for him because the question “is still under consideration.”xv  
On the 18
th, Zhou returned to the issue, but only to tell his American guest that “[I]t 
seems this time during this visit it will be difficult to make further progress.”xvi  Zhou 
had been consulting intensively with various interested parties in advance of 
Kissinger’s arrival, including with Sihanouk’s prime minister, Penn Nouth, North 
Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris, Le Duc Tho, North Vietnamese deputy prime 
minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and senior Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary, but it 
appears that Sihanouk refused to meet Zhou Enlai while Kissinger was present in the 
Chinese capital.  This was an unusual turn of events, for when Sihanouk wished to 
make a premeditated gesture of dissatisfaction with his Chinese hosts he normally 
departed the Chinese capital for Pyongyang.  In all likelihood Sihanouk, or more 
likely Ieng Sary, did not want a Sihanouk-Zhou meeting at this time to discuss 
whatever it was Kissinger had to propose in order to dissipate pressure Zhou might 
have brought to bear to compromise.  Zhou did, however, manage to hold talks with 
Sihanouk, Penn Nouth and Ieng Sary the day after Kissinger’s departure, as well as 
with representatives of Hanoi. And despite the nervousness, in whichever form Zhou 
conveyed the essence of his discussions with Kissinger to Sihanouk ‘in his own 
words’, it grabbed Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge’s interest.xvii 
 Similarly, there seems to have been a fairly rapid evolution in Chinese 
thinking over this period.  The previous October Zhou had asked Le Thanh Nghi to 
encourage the Khmer comrades to take advantage of any possibility for talks.  In a 
rather curious request for intervention, the Chinese Premier had asked the 
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Vietnamese to encourage the Khmers to negotiate, because China was worried about 
losing influence there if it did so.  “We are not in a position to do so because we have 
talked with them a lot about fighting and encouraged them to fight.  We suggest the 
Vietnamese Workers’ Party find a suitable moment to tell them.” xviii   In early 
February Zhou was still concerned that the resolution of the situation in Cambodia be 
kept separate from the Vietnam issue, and that Beijing, not Hanoi, be the arbiter.  
Hanoi had begun to restrict the flow of Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge, in an 
attempt to force them to negotiate.
xix
  And while in discussions with Penn Nouth 
Zhou reminded the GRUNK prime minister that “If there had not been victories on 
the battlefield, there would not have been gains at the negotiation table”, within this 
apparent endorsement of continued military action was contained a caution to the 
contrary: the balance of forces had tilted in their favour
 
it would indeed be 
appropriate to negotiate.
xx
  Barely two weeks later Zhou told Kissinger that a 
coalition government was desirable in Phnom Penh.  “Because it is impossible for 
Cambodia to become completely red now.  If that were attempted, it would result in 
even greater problems” and committed himself to communicating Kissinger’s 
thinking to Sihanouk.
xxi
  But until he was certain of success and the centrality of a 
role for China, Zhou did not yet want to risk alienating the Cambodian resistance.
xxii
 
 What Zhou meant by the ‘problematic’ nature of attempting to attain a ‘red 
Cambodia’ was that continued fighting in Cambodia to attain a complete victory 
would create an even more complicated situation, one in which the American 
bombing of Cambodia would continue and Nixon would still be distracted from 
dealing with the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world by his continued travails in 
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Indochina.  Furthermore, China’s influence on the outcome in Cambodia would be 
greatly reduced by any formula that removed Sihanouk, and there existed every 
possibility that the Khmer Rouge would cast him aside when his usefulness had 
expired (as Sihanouk publicly admitted in a newspaper interview).  Finally, in early 
1973 the full extent and extremes of the platform of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea were still not well known.  Over the previous two years ‘Viet Khmers’ 
had been returning from Hanoi to take part in the Cambodian revolution.  Their 
influence on the future direction of the C.P.K.’s own revolution was still unclear; 
furthermore as the prospect of power grew closer tension between the ‘returnees’ and 
the Pol Pot faction were likely to intensify.  All in all, it was not an auspicious time 
for the GRUNK to carry on their war in the face of the power of the U.S. Air Force.  
As Zhou explained to Kissinger, “So if we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along 
the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, then 
Cambodia would be an exemplar country.”xxiii 
 In late February, less than a week after Kissinger left the Chinese capital and 
after having consulted with GRUNK leaders and the Vietnamese comrades, Zhou 
confirmed the intentions of the Chinese government in a note sent to the Americans 
concerning the upcoming international Paris conference on Vietnam.  Zhou stated 
China’s agreement with the provisions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign 
military forces from Cambodia and Laos, a point that would later be further 
emphasized by Zhou in discussions with the head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, 
David Bruce.  The February note welcomed the agreement on a ceasefire in Laos, 
but restated China’s opposition to the Paris conference discussing Laos and 
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Cambodia: Vietnam was to be the sole topic.  Zhou’s fear was that an agreement on 
Cambodia would be reached in an international conference at which both the Soviets 
and Vietnamese played a major role - clearly he much preferred a deal in which 
China was the main broker.  To be sure that the message had been understood, 
referring to the ongoing discussions in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on a 
joint communiqué on implementing the agreement, in his inaugural discussions with 
David Bruce the Chinese premier insisted that the question of Cambodia could not be 
solved in Paris.  Zhou was making clear that he was the only person that could 
deliver Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.
xxiv
 
 Attempts at resolution of the Cambodian issue stalled during March, as Zhou 
was forced to take two weeks’ leave to undergo treatment for his cancer and 
Sihanouk disappeared off into the Cambodian jungles to visit the ‘liberated’ areas.  
Upon his return in early April, at a grand state banquet to mark the occasion hosted 
by Zhou Enlai, the feisty prince triumphantly showed film footage of his visit to 
Cambodia.  During his speech to mark the occasion he defiantly rejected both 
ceasefire and compromise: “If the U.S.A. does not stop its interference in Cambodia 
we will go on fighting.”  Zhou reaffirmed the support of the Chinese government for 
Sihanouk as Cambodian head-of-state, and condemned the American “wanton 
bombing” of his country.  However, Sihanouk also publicly reaffirmed his February 
offer of talks with the U.S. (which had already been repeated by Xinhua on 23 
March).  He announced he was willing to discuss “the question of ending U.S. 
interference in Cambodia”. If the U.S. agreed to stop aiding Lon Nol and enter into 
talks with Sihanouk, the door to negotiation was open.
xxv
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 On 16 April, Kissinger met with the Chinese representative to the United 
Nations, Huang Hua, in New York, just a few days after the American side had 
passed on a note expressing “extreme disappointment” at Zhou’s remarks during the 
banquet for Prince Sihanouk.  Contrary to his claims in his memoirs, it was Kissinger 
himself who made the running during the meeting with regard to Cambodia.  The 
American National Security Adviser practically offered to give up Lon Nol (“we are 
not committed to any particular personality”), not in response to Huang Hua’s 
condemnation of American policy and support for the Phnom Penh government but 
to pre-empt it, telling Huang that “Our objective in Southeast Asia seems to us not 
totally dissimilar from yours.”  By this, of course, he meant the exclusion of Soviet 
influence.  As his assistant Winston Lord noted, Kissinger had been “fuzzy” on 
whether “it might be the United States talking to [Sihanouk] rather than the 
Cambodian Government.”xxvi 
 In his reply, and speaking in a “personal capacity”, Huang Hua reminded 
Kissinger that “the Chinese position is consistent and has been made public… Last 
February Premier Zhou Enlai again advised the US side not to intervene in 
Cambodian internal affairs any longer so that the Cambodian people could resolve 
the problem by themselves.”  He also subtly emphasized the independence of the 
Khmer Rouge from the Vietnamese by reminding the national security adviser that 
“the Cambodian People’s Liberation Forces are fighting absolutely alone without the 
aid of the North Vietnamese troops or of the South Vietnamese National Liberation 
Forces.”  He condemned U.S. policy in Cambodia by noting that Sihanouk was ready 
to negotiate with the U.S. side, but “[T]he U.S. side has not only refused to negotiate, 
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but has intensified the bombing of Cambodia…  [I]t will only hamper the solution of 
the Cambodian question, and at the same time will affect adversely Sino-US 
relations.”  However, as Kissinger later noted, Huang Hua’s condemnation was 
“aimed at an individual and not a structure… [It] left open the prospect discussed in 
Beijing in February of including other elements of the Phnom Penh government in a 
coalition without their present chief.”  It was a prospect Kissinger was not going to 
pass up.
xxvii
 
 Kissinger’s flexibility on the issue of the leadership in Phnom Penh did not 
stem, in the main, from a desire to keep the Soviets out of Cambodia, whatever he 
told Huang Hua.  If there was one thing that historically united France, Vietnam, and 
America, it was a casual disregard for the fate of Laos and Cambodia when 
compared to the larger strategic prize of southern Vietnam.  In this light, the growing 
sense of urgency with which Kissinger was addressing the problem of Cambodia was 
largely fuelled by growing concerns about what a communist takeover of Cambodia 
would mean for South Vietnam.  Uncovering its “entire western flank… would pose 
a real and psychological threat to the Thieu government which it could not 
withstand” his deputy, General Al Haig reported back from a trip to Cambodia.  This 
“must lead inevitably to the near term collapse of South Vietnam with all the 
political, psychological and strategic implications that such a collapse forebodes.”  
Most worryingly of all, Haig stated: “Without an immediate broadening of the 
current regime in the Khmer Republic, the viability of the government and the armed 
forces must be limited to 3 to 6 months”.  To most of the leading actors, with the 
possible notable exception of Pol Pot, the prospect of some degree of co-operation 
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between the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists seemed likely, if not assured.  
With this in mind, it was little wonder that Kissinger was so eager to discuss a 
formula for getting Sihanouk in place and potentially forestalling the fall of – not 
Cambodia – South Vietnam.  However, he was still not yet ready to talk to Sihanouk 
to make it happen.
xxviii
 
 Kissinger pursued his theme in a written message passed to Zhou on 24 April, 
where he expressed the willingness of the United States to contemplate “a settlement 
which includes all political forces, including those of Prince Sihanouk.”  He hoped 
that the Chinese would follow up the matter with David Bruce when he arrived in 
Beijing, which Zhou duly did.  The Chinese Premier confirmed that the United States 
and China both sought a Cambodia that would be “more peaceful, neutral, and 
independent than ever before.”xxix  This clearly precluded Vietnamese control, and 
even in the short-term a total Khmer Rouge victory.  Encouraged by Zhou’s words, 
but growing impatient and increasingly concerned about the prospects for Cambodia, 
Kissinger finally decided to back down on the U.S. refusal to talk to Sihanouk and 
made a formal proposal to the Chinese.  His hand was being forced; three days 
before David Bruce met with Zhou Enlai, the House of Representatives, in its first 
ever vote to restrict military operations in Southeast Asia, had voted for an 
amendment to prevent funds from an appropriations Bill being used to bomb 
Cambodia.
xxx
  In a meeting with Huang Hua in New York he told Huang that: 
 
We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw 
the very small advisory group we have there.   And we are prepared to arrange for Lon 
Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States.  In return we would like a 
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cease-fire – if necessary, say for ninety days – a negotiation between the Sihanouk 
group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on 
in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador 
Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking... But it is a process that has to be extended over 
some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our 
own necessities.
xxxi
 
 
In return, Huang Hua had a message for Kissinger from Zhou.  It reiterated Zhou’s 
message to Bruce, re-emphasizing the Chinese Premier’s personal involvement, that 
“the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris.  It is imperative that the two 
sides [North Vietnam and the United States] respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.”  
This message also emphasized that not only Sihanouk, but also “the resistance forces 
at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side.”  Zhou’s goals were 
clear: a North Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia; an end to American bombing; 
and a coalition government with Sihanouk at its head.  This was to be the first 
concrete test of Sino-American co-operation; in exchange for Kissinger ending the 
bombing and agreeing to the removal of Lon Nol from the scene, Zhou would bring 
Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge into a coalition.  Once achieved, they could achieve 
their mutual goal: the withdrawal of North Vietnam from Cambodia.
xxxii
 
 China responded speedily to Kissinger’s 27 May  proposal.  On the afternoon 
of 4 June, the National Security Adviser hosted Huang Zhen in his White House 
office.
xxxiii
  Huang, who had just taken his place as the head of the P.R.C. liaison 
office in Washington, had two messages for Kissinger, the second message of which 
was of substance and significance.  It confirmed that the basic Chinese stance was 
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that which had been outlined by Zhou in his discussions with David Bruce, and 
emphasised “respect [for] Cambodia’s sovereignty.”  Zhou asserted that while China 
would convey to Sihanouk Kissinger’s general analysis, Beijing would not negotiate 
on his behalf and Washington would have to conduct direct talks with the prince.  As 
an indication of the seriousness with which Zhou was taking the American initiative, 
the message took the unprecedented step of repeating verbatim “the U.S. tentative 
thinking”, requesting that “If there are any inaccuracies in the above, it is expected 
that the U.S. side will provide corrections.
xxxiv
 
 As Kissinger correctly observed, this was an unmistakable sign that Zhou 
was personally engaging himself in the resolution of the Cambodian issue on the 
basis of Kissinger’s proposal.  Likewise, Kissinger was also correct in his assessment 
that “he would not act as an intermediary unless he expected to succeed.”xxxv  The 
message was delivered on the day that Vietnam Workers’ Party General Secretary Le 
Duan and the North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong, arrived in Beijing for an 
official visit; this served to emphasize that Zhou would be working both sides of the 
equation to ensure that all parties concerned should ‘respect Cambodia’s 
sovereignty’.  Nonetheless, Zhou clearly believed that he could deliver Sihanouk and 
the Khmer Rouge, a ceasefire, and eventually a coalition government in return for 
America ditching Lon Nol, holding direct talks with the Prince, and ceasing bombing.  
In fact, the Chinese premier had staked his personal prestige on it.
xxxvi
 
 
The collapse of the plan 
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Despite this plan, the situation in Cambodia remained unclear and uncertain for Mao 
and Zhou as much as Nixon and Kissinger.  The Americans believed that Hanoi was 
pulling at least some of the strings of the Khmer Rouge, and that a victory for Saloth 
Sar (though Washington was only beginning to become familiar with that name) 
would mean doom for South Vietnam.  Beijing was obviously much more aware that 
the Vietnamese were not in control of the situation in Cambodia, and the Chinese 
had banked large assets through the careful cultivation of Sihanouk, but the future 
direction of C.P.K. policy was impossible to tell.  It was as yet too early to gauge the 
impact of the Cambodian communist ‘returnees’ – Khmer cadres from the Viet Minh 
days who had regrouped to Hanoi – who were now returning to their homeland in the 
wake of the Paris Accords.  Likewise, it was probably in Hanoi’s calculations that 
these returning Khmer communists, who accepted Vietnam’s lead role in the 
Indochinese revolution, would find it easier to make their voice heard in a peaceful 
environment rather than in a war-zone.  So despite their differing perceptions, as Le 
Duc Tho told Ieng Sary, “China, Vietnam, and the United States all want to solve the 
Cambodian problem soon.”  Unfortunately none of them was in a position to solve it 
without the acquiescence of an exiled Cambodian Prince and a xenophobic Khmer 
communist; not for the first time, the vicissitudes of Cambodian politics would test 
Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic skills to the limit.xxxvii 
 For all Zhou and Kissinger’s careful choreography, nothing could happen 
without the danseur noble, the elusive Prince Sihanouk.  The Prince, basking in the 
glory of his trip to the ‘liberated areas’ of his homeland had set off on an 
international tour, with the aim of cultivating votes in support of a GRUNK 
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challenge for Cambodia’s United Nations seat at the annual session of the U.N. 
general assembly in the autumn.  The process was ostensibly paralyzed without him, 
and it is likely Zhou dared not attempt to communicate confidentially such important 
matters to him while he was thousands of miles away and, more dangerously, within 
the earshot of dozens of international journalists and beyond the natural restraints 
imposed by his residence in the Chinese capital.  Kissinger’s opening offer merely 
indicated that staff of the U.S. liaison office would be willing to meet with Sihanouk, 
not the Nixon, or Kissinger, or Harriman or Mansfield Sihanouk had hoped for.  The 
chances that the Prince’s wounded ego, at large in the capitals of Africa, would cause 
him to reject such an offer were high, and Zhou sought to avoid China being publicly 
named as a mediator in Cambodia.
xxxviii
   
 While in Paris, Kissinger took the time to call on the Chinese foreign minister, 
Ji Pengfei, who was visiting the U.K. and France at the time.  Kissinger’s eagerness 
to implement the steps he had outlined to the Chinese was evident, and he urged Ji to 
act upon them.  Ji pointed out, however, that “There is only one problem, that 
Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is not now in China and it is difficult to contact him.”  
Kissinger’s impatience was growing, fuelled by his awareness that the passing of the 
Case-Church amendment in the Senate (which would cut off all funds for military 
operations in Indochina) meant that the window of opportunity to close a deal in 
Cambodia was rapidly shutting.  He enquired if Ji knew when the volatile Prince 
would return to China.  “He was supposed to be back by the end of June” laughed 
the Foreign Minister, “But you know his temper, and he likes to add countries when 
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he is happy.”  “Maybe we should depress him!” interjected Kissinger, only half-
joking.
xxxix
 
Time pressures created by the Congress notwithstanding, Kissinger had 
reason to feel somewhat optimistic.  Zhou Enlai was committed to delivering talks 
among the Cambodian parties if Kissinger agreed to meet with Sihanouk, and in the 
three secret protocols agreed to in Paris, Le Duc Tho had committed Hanoi to 
reaffirming Article 20 of the Paris Agreement.  Specifically Tho had affirmed that 
“foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn as 
required by Article 20 (b) of the Agreement.”  Furthermore, Tho had promised that 
the D.R.V. would, along with the United States, “exert their best efforts to bring 
about a peaceful settlement in Cambodia.” xl   Despite Kissinger’s belief to the 
contrary - what he later categorized as “North Vietnam’s imperial ambitions” – 
Hanoi was in fact interested in achieving a settlement in Cambodia - even if on a 
temporary basis.
xli
  However, what Zhou Enlai and China could deliver to the 
Cambodians, and which the Vietnamese could not, was an American bombing halt; 
whatever his misappraisal of the influence accorded by Vietnamese forces in 
Cambodia, on this Kissinger was correct. 
 “We can’t reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now 
Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled” Kissinger told 
Huang Zhen back in Washington on June 14
th
.  While perhaps rather over-optimistic 
that “everything else will be easy”, Kissinger was correct that Cambodia was now 
key.  Nixon’s position was weakening by the day as a result of Watergate, and the 
threat of U.S. military action to uphold the Paris Agreement becoming less credible.  
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The only cards that Nixon and Kissinger held were those of Cambodia and 
reconstruction aid for the D.R.V., and they were a pair: Kissinger needed Congress 
to at least hold out the possibility of aid for Hanoi in order to secure a Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia; at the same time, successful implementation of article 
20 of the Paris Agreement held out the possibility of dollar-induced leverage over 
Hanoi.  Without the pair, Kissinger and Nixon held nothing, and their bluff would 
surely be called; such a situation would cause Beijing to have to reappraise the 
P.R.C.’s whole Indochinese strategy.  But for a period Kissinger seemed to have 
overcome this challenge.  He was “on the homestretch” to a cease-fire and 
Sihanouk’s return, just a few steps away from salvaging the situation in Phnom Penh 
and securing an extra prop under Thieu’s western flank at a time when Watergate 
was causing others to wobble.
xlii
 
 Aside from Sihanouk’s travel plans, the other factor that had the potential to 
disrupt Zhou and Kissinger’s plan was the U.S. Congress.  On May 31st, by a 
majority of 69 to 19, the Senate had approved the Eagleton amendment, a measure 
far stricter than that which had been approved by the House of Representatives two 
weeks earlier.  Sen. Eagleton’s measure proposed to cut off all funds “‘heretofore’ 
used to support military action ‘in, over or from the shores of’ Cambodia or 
Laos.”xliii  Unsurprisingly, Nixon vetoed the bill, but Senate Majority Leader, Mike 
Mansfield, promised to attach the Eagleton amendment to every bill that came before 
the Senate until Nixon was forced to sign it into law.  Kissinger made a bid for time 
on two fronts: he appealed to Nixon’s Counsellor for Domestic Affairs to try and 
make an arrangement with the leadership of the House of Representatives to hold up 
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the offending amendments in order to allow his Cambodian plans to proceed, but to 
no avail.  To provide further impetus on the Chinese side, on 19 June Kissinger 
reversed his earlier position and committed himself to meet with Sihanouk during his 
planned visit to Beijing in early August - not just meetings between their respective 
representatives - if a ceasefire were in place by the time of his arrival.  The prospect 
would surely be very tempting for the Cambodia’s exiled leader.xliv 
 For a period at the end of June, despite the increasing pressure coming from 
Congress, pronouncements from the Prince indicated that there was still hope of a 
deal.  Speaking in Bucharest on 22 June, the GRUNK leader announced that his 
“government” (of which the Khmer Rouge was a part) had “formally proposed to the 
U.S. government to hold bilateral negotiations in the pattern of the ‘Washington-
Hanoi’ talks with a view to putting an honourable end to the present war in 
Cambodia, with no victor or loser.”  Nixon, continued the Prince, “refused 
categorically and definitively our proposal by repeating that we should negotiate 
with the clique of the puppet and traitor Lon Nol”.  The solution was simple, he 
added.  “This problem will be solved and peace will return to Cambodia… once the 
United States stops giving military aid and air protection to the puppet Lon Nol 
regime.”  While resolute, Sihanouk’s position was not irreconcilable with that which 
Kissinger was putting forward; though he did not know it yet, his demand for direct 
meetings had been acceded to, subject to a ceasefire.  The issue left at stake was the 
Indochinese version of the ‘chicken and the egg question’: the sequencing of the 
talks and the bombing halt/ceasefire.  While there was still room for hope, nothing 
could yet be settled until Sihanouk returned to the Chinese capital.  Unfortunately for 
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Zhou and Kissinger, this left the U.S. Congress with an extra few weeks to settle 
definitively the vexed issue of which came first.
xlv
 
 By the time Sihanouk returned to Beijing the issue had been resolved.  Nixon 
was beset by scandals on several fronts; on June 25
th
, former White House counsel 
John Dean began his testimony before the Senate inquiry into the Watergate scandal 
and directly implicated the President.  And if that wasn’t enough to make Nixon feel 
sick, BREAKFAST, LUNCH, and DINNER were coming back to bother the 
President.  Senator Howard Hughes’s investigations into the 1969 secret bombings 
of Cambodia were revealing an organised campaign of deception, including the 
falsification of bombing co-ordinates, designed to keep from Congress the actions 
being undertaken by the U.S. Air Force.  To many members of Congress, legislating 
a cessation of the bombing of Cambodia was no longer merely about ending what 
Kissinger described as “bombing the bejesus” out of the Khmer Republic – a tactic 
that seemed to many members of the Senate pointless and futile; the issue was now 
totemic “for the balance of power between the Congress and the President – as well 
as for its effects in cutting off bombing raids in Cambodia.”  Ending the bombing of 
Cambodia was now about far more than Cambodia, it was about wresting 
constitutional authority to wage war back from an executive that had in many 
senators’ eyes used lies and subterfuge to appropriate it.  Realising that he held no 
cards to play, the expert poker-player Nixon folded and agreed a cut-off date of 15 
August.
xlvi
 
 In his efforts to persuade Congress that an end to the bombing was an unwise 
move and one that undermined the diplomacy of the administration, Kissinger had 
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been forced to hint at what was in the offing under Zhou’s auspices.  Likewise, State 
Department officials, perhaps overly confident of success, had conducted a little too 
much of the ‘briefing’ that Chairman Mao had warned Nixon about the previous year, 
and highlighted the anticipated role of China.
xlvii
  Furthermore, articles appeared 
explicitly linking Kissinger’s planned August visit to Beijing with a negotiated 
settlement in Phnom Penh; at the same time, however, denials were issued that 
Kissinger would be meeting with Sihanouk.  The sum total effect was that Kissinger 
over-played his hand.  A few days before Sihanouk returned to Beijing, Zhou 
transmitted a message for Huang Zhen to deliver to the White House.  It complained 
about the stories appearing in the press (originating in Washington) pointing towards 
a U.S.-Chinese mediated end to the war that had “enraged [Sihanouk] all the more.”  
Charitably, Beijing put the blame for the circulating stories on the “Lon Nol clique… 
spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official 
negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United 
States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens… The Chinese side is of 
the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a 
settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble.” xlviii   When 
Sihanouk touched down in Beijing, trouble indeed it had caused. 
 On arrival, Sihanouk announced that it “is useless to talk to Kissinger.  There 
is no time for talk.  Now it is too late.  We will continue our armed struggle.”xlix  The 
Prince announced his fear that along with Lon Nol, he too was to be cut out of the 
agreement.  It appears he had gotten wind of the press speculation just before he left 
Bucharest to return to China, justifying Zhou’s apprehension of attempting to 
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communicate with him on the matter while he was abroad.  Mentioning his Chinese 
hosts in unusually negative terms, he announced that “Neither Moscow nor Peking 
nor Paris have [sic] the right to settle our fate in secret.”l  The next evening, July 6th, 
he spoke in Beijing, as defiant as ever.  He made repeated references to the 15 
August bombing cut-off, and was now concerned that the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ meant 
that the United States would simply transfer responsibility for the bombing of 
Cambodia to South Vietnam – a prospect that had been raised by official spokesmen 
for the Saigon government.   Sihanouk roundly condemned the “old fox” Nixon and 
his “genocide” against the Cambodian people in whose name the Prince significantly 
denounced “the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government which claims that ‘negotiations 
are under way and yielding results’ concerning the solution of the Cambodian 
problem.” li   Zhou and Kissinger’s desired outcome in Phnom Penh, so recently 
almost within grasp, seemed to be slipping out of reach. 
 In his own speech Zhou made no mention of the bombing halt; in fact, while 
offering the standard expression of “firmly support[ing] the just stand of the 
Cambodian people” Zhou significantly highlighted “Sihanouk’s historic five-point 
declaration” as “the clear direction for a settlement of the Cambodian question.”  
Furthermore, he pointed out that Sihanouk and the GRUNK “have again and again 
demanded that the United States immediately stop its bombing and military 
intervention in Cambodia.”lii  The clear implication from this was that now that this 
prospect was imminent, the Cambodian issue should indeed be settled on the basis of 
Sihanouk’s March 23rd 1970 declaration – up until that point the declared basis for a 
settlement.  By contrast, Sihanouk did not even make reference to this “historic” 
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statement in his reply; rather he laid out three demands “which constitute and will 
constitute unalterably the only solution of the Cambodian problem: 
 
 -First, complete and final cessation of all military (air and other) interventions by 
the U.S.A., its satellites in Bangkok and Saigon and other hostile countries. 
 -Second, complete elimination of the traitorous, illegal, anti-national, anti-
popular, fascist and utterly corrupt “Khmer Republic”. 
 -Third, total, unconditional and irreversible withdrawal of all U.S. and pro-U.S. 
military personnel and all non-Cambodian personnel serving U.S. imperialism-neo-
colonialism from Khmer territory.”liii 
 
 In a similarly defiant vein, he made a call for “arms and particularly 
ammunition, again ammunition and always ammunition… so as to help them prevent 
the extermination of the Khmer country and people and regain national 
independence.”  By contrast he again reiterated that China was “our No 1 
supporter”.liv  Through these comments he was clearly taking aim at North Vietnam 
who had been reducing their arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge since the signing 
of the Paris Peace Accords.  As Le Duan had told the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi in 
April, “[O]ur support and help to the Cambodian friends is decreasing and its scale is 
now insignificant.”lv  It is unclear to what extent Sihanouk was acting on his own 
initiative in an effort to get out ahead of what he anticipated to be the Khmer Rouge 
response, or whether he was already acting under pressure from the ‘interior’.  If it 
was a case of Sihanouk predicting which way the political wind was going to blow it 
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was a good judgement: at some point in July at a C.P.K. Central Committee meeting 
Pol Pot declared that there would be absolutely no negotiations.
lvi
 
 While at this point Zhou had clearly not given up hope of being able to 
arrange a negotiation, he was manifestly annoyed at the turn of events in Washington 
and the Congress-imposed bombing halt.  Earlier in the day he had met a 
congressional delegation led by Senator Warren Magnuson, during which Sen. 
Magnuson had discussed, at length, the situation in Cambodia and the role of 
Congress in forcing Nixon to end the bombing.  While Zhou had offered the standard 
Chinese condemnation of U.S. actions in Cambodia, Magnuson – a ‘dove’ on 
Vietnam who had voted for both the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield 
amendments – had “stressed the role of Congress in cutting off the bombing and 
repeatedly urged Zhou to ‘Be patient.  It’ll be over soon.’”  According to David 
Bruce, “Zhou had been visibly angered by Magnuson’s attempt to engage him with 
the Congress against the President.” lvii   The timing of the collapse was most 
inopportune for the Chinese premier. 
 The C.C.P.’s Tenth Party Congress was an unusual affair, to put it mildly: it 
had been called early and was cloaked in secrecy.
lviii
  It was almost certainly as a 
result of this and not, as Kissinger presumed, the failing proposals for Cambodia that 
Huang Zhen was called back to China at this time.
lix
  Beijing requested a slight delay 
in the announcement of the date of Kissinger’s visit until such times as Huang had 
arrived back in the Chinese capital.  The soon-to-be nominated secretary of state, 
however, took fright.  He had leaked so much to the press about the expected 6 
August visit and the anticipated agreements on Cambodia that the visit would 
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conclude, that a failure to deliver would deprive Nixon of a hoped-for foreign policy 
success at a time of great domestic difficulty. Closer to home, Kissinger surely 
worried, it might even give Nixon cause to reconsider moving Kissinger to take 
control of the State Department.  His insolent response, as he later admitted, was “the 
defence of the weak.”lx 
 He immediately dispatched his National Security deputy, Brent Scowcroft, to 
express Kissinger’s “surprise” at the delay of the August trip announcement, and 
warned that as Kissinger was the “‘sole architect’ of U.S.-P.R.C. normalization, if he 
is embarrassed over the Cambodia issue it could jeopardize the U.S.-P.R.C. 
reconciliation.  What would HAK be able to bring back from Beijing regarding 
Cambodia?” lxi  Kissinger got his reply in the most stark of terms.  On 18 July the 
Chinese delivered a note definitively terminating the proposed intervention; 
Sihanouk, and more likely Pol Pot, could not be delivered.  “[T]he Chinese side 
holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk the 
tentative thinking on the settlement of the Cambodian question as set forth by the 
U.S. side in late May.  The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with 
frankness.”lxii 
 Zhou had called time on the proposed intervention in Cambodia because 
Kissinger had made its successful realisation a prior condition to his arrival in 
Beijing in early August.  To emphasize the point, the following day another message 
was delivered informing the National Security Adviser that the proposed visit date in 
early August was now “inconvenient”.  The Chinese would, however, welcome 
Kissinger on 16 August, the day after the bombing halt came into force.  There was 
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little anger expressed in the note, however, unlike that of the previous day referring 
to Cambodia and in which the Chinese had advised that “If the United States truly 
desires to settle the Cambodian question, the… demands raised by the Cambodian 
side should be acceptable to it.  It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious 
consideration to this and translate it into action.”  The two issues were being 
divorced: Zhou could not deliver on Cambodia by 6 August but Kissinger was still 
welcome.  As with Vietnam before it, Zhou was determined not to let Cambodia 
interfere with Sino-American relations.
lxiii
 
 It is clear though that Zhou’s refusal to pass on Kissinger’s 27 May offer was 
in many respects as much an admission of China’s own weakness in regards to 
Cambodia as it was an expression of frustration over the turn of events in both that 
country and the U.S.  Zhou’s inability to manipulate a scenario to the mutual benefit 
of both China and the United States was frustrating, but was by no means an 
irrevocable blow to the burgeoning partnership.  For that reason the two different 
Chinese messages separated the issues and vowed to move on irrespective of the 
failed initiative.  In this manner and even at this late stage Zhou did not give up on 
the prospect of coming to some sort of negotiated settlement in Cambodia: as late as 
16 August, the day after the U.S. bombing of Cambodia ended and on which the 
Chinese had proposed Kissinger arrive in Beijing (serving as a subtle riposte to his 
‘insolence’), Zhou was in consultation with Pham Van Dong opining that it would be 
“unwise” if “these chances [for negotiation] are not exploited.”lxiv  By this stage, 
however, the Khmer Rouge had forced Hanoi’s hand as well as Beijing’s.  They had 
continued their assault on Phnom Penh throughout July and August in the face of the 
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most intense campaign of aerial bombardment the world had ever seen.  By doing so, 
the K.R. had forced Hanoi to recommence their supply of Pol Pot’s forces.  In the 
latter half of 1973, in recognition of the implacability of the Khmer Rouge military 
assault, force majeure compelled Beijing, just as it had Hanoi, to throw its weight 
behind the forces of the C.P.K. and their search for an outright military victory in 
Cambodia.  All plans for a negotiated settlement were from that point forward 
irrelevant.
lxv
 
 
As this article has shown, while Kissinger often misinterpreted Chinese intentions 
and meaning in his negotiations with them, and was frequently guilty of (at best) 
misrepresenting events to colour their historical interpretation, this does not mean, of 
course, that he always did both, or either.  However, in both his interpretation and 
presentation of the circumstances surrounding the attempt at a negotiated end to the 
war in Cambodia in June 1973, he was correct.  The manner in which his Chinese 
interlocutors handled this issue singled it out as an area in which, unlike similar 
aspirations on Kissinger’s part with regard to Vietnam, the Chinese government 
indicated a clear and concrete interest in acting as an intermediary between the 
United States and Sihanouk’s government-in-exile, although it did not want this role 
to be publicized.  This, as Kissinger himself pointed out, would not have been 
attempted without a high degree of confidence on Zhou Enlai’s part that it would be 
successful.  Suddenly, however, the Chinese mediation ended: a sure signal that they 
had concluded that the other side could not be delivered.  So what changed in the 
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interim?  Three factors at play must be assessed: the impact of the bombing halt;  
Kissinger’s ‘impetuous’ over-reach; and Chinese and Cambodian domestic politics. 
 While it may be true that the Congressionally-mandated bombing halt was 
not solely to blame for the collapse of the Chinese mediation, it is similarly 
inconceivable that in the cat-and-mouse/chicken-and-egg world of ceasefire and 
negotiation politics it had no effect.  This is substantiated by the claim that Pol Pot 
made his decision to continue the armed struggle to the bitter end in July 1973, after 
the late June announcement of Nixon’s 15 August compromise.  And even if the halt 
was not solely responsible for the collapse of the ‘peace plan’, it did initiate a chain 
of events that cumulatively doomed the initiative. 
 The second factor was Zhou’s and Sihanouk’s anger at the leaks stemming 
from Kissinger’s office about the impending success of a Chinese mediation, and his 
attempts to tie his proposed Beijing visit to it.  Zhou Enlai made clear that these 
media stories were an extremely unhelpful intervention, and almost certainly 
inflamed the volatile Sihanouk and caused embarrassment for the Chinese 
government.  Perhaps, as suggested by Kenton Clymer, this was the key factor in 
derailing the mediation.  However, it cannot be overlooked that the catalyst for the 
briefings was partly Kissinger’s having to work against the backdrop of a potential 
bombing halt, forcing him to attempt to forestall one by ‘hinting’ at what was in the 
offing without being able to discuss it on the record.  (Though no doubt, the dreaded 
prospect of the collapse of Cambodia so close to his own hoped-for nomination as 
secretary of state raised the level of his ‘impetuosity’ by a notch or two.)  It is 
unlikely though that this was a decisive factor, given Zhou and Mao’s long and 
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unsatisfactory experience of leaks from their American counterparts, and the relative 
restraint that accompanied their complaints on this matter. 
 The final factor is the most problematic: internal Cambodian and Chinese 
politics.  We may never have a historical record for the decision-making processes of 
the Khmer Rouge in this period, and the Chinese records are still largely off-limits.  
However, the collapse of this Zhou-Kissinger plan occurred precisely in the same 
week that Mao Zedong began to voice his concerns about Zhou’s conduct of foreign 
policy.
lxvi
  There is currently nothing in the literature to suggest that the failure of this 
initiative was behind Mao’s sudden dissatisfaction with his premier; however, that 
does not preclude the possibility that Mao himself changed his stance on the issue in 
the wake of the bombing halt – itself perhaps one of the turns of events that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was criticized for failing to predict.  In any case, the 
failure of Zhou and Kissinger to succeed in this effort marked the zenith of Zhou’s 
influence in Beijing, influence to no small degree created by the success of his 
relationship with Kissinger over the previous two-year period, and jealousy over 
which played a large factor in his fall. 
  
While it may be the case that blaming Congress for the defeat of South Vietnam is 
indeed “sophistic”, Congress’s role in the premature termination of Cambodia’s only 
(even if marginal) hope for a negotiated end to its war cannot be dismissed so 
lightly.
lxvii
  Certainly, Kissinger’s failure until the eleventh hour to offer to meet with 
Sihanouk (and, in the words of William Shawcross, the “contempt” with which he 
generally viewed him) meant that Kissinger himself was largely responsible for the 
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creation of the time pressure to beat the bombing halt.
lxviii
  Similarly, Nixon and 
Kissinger’s opening to China and negotiated end to the American war in Vietnam 
undermined for many members of the Senate much of the ‘anti-Communist’ 
rationale for propping up Lon Nol in any case.
lxix
  And, of course, by the summer of 
1973 many members of Congress were beginning to view with suspicion the White 
House’s claims and contentions on many topics. 
 Nonetheless, the evidence currently available indicates that for a brief 
moment in June 1973 there was a real and viable opportunity to bring about a 
negotiated end to the war in Cambodia, which was snuffed out by the well-
intentioned, quite understandable, yet mistimed intervention of Congress.  Painfully 
ironically, the failure of this effort also marked the end of the honeymoon period in 
relations between the P.R.C. and United States, and of a degree of amity to which 
they would not return until the end of the decade when both were again drawn 
together in support of the Khmer Rouge’s ‘Democratic Kampuchea’.lxx 
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